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From Greed to Grievance
The Shifting Political Profile of the
Colombian Paramilitaries
Winifred Tate

n June 28, 2004, indicted drug trafficker and paramilitary leader

O

Salvatore Mancuso, wearing a fashionable Italian suit and tie, ad

dressed the Colombian Congress from the podium. "The judgment

of history will recognize the goodness and nobility of our cause," he told the
ass embled legislators and press. The day before, Mancuso, along with two
other paramilitary leaders, had traveled i n an official air force plane from

the small northern Colombia hamlet where paramilitary leaders had as
sembled to begin talks with the Colombian government. After almost a de
cade of fighting outside the law, Mancuso was now addressing the heart of
the state, his many arrest warrants-as well as the extradition order issued
by the U.S. government that would land him in a jail in Washington, D.C.,
four years later-temporarily suspended as the Colombian government and
the paramilitary leaders began negotiations intended to demobilize para
military fighters in exchange for state benefits.
Over the past decade, paramilitary forces under the umbrella of the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) transformed themselves from re
gional renegades to political operators and valid interlocutors, respected in
many quarters as worthy of sitting at the negotiating table with the govern
ment. This metamorphosis involved changes in paramilitary tactics, as well as
a

substantial public relations campaign aimed at changing public perceptions

at home and abroad. These groups had begun new and wider military opera
tions in the late 1990s, dramatically expanding their numbers from an esti
mated 2,500 in the early 1990s to more than 15,000 by the end of the decade,
Research for this chapter was contracted in part by the United States Institute of Peace; earlier
research was paid for in part by a grant from the Wenner-Gren Foundation. The author would
like to thank Cathy Lutz and particularly Mary Roldan for their thoughtful comments.
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and embarked on offensive military campaigns to conquer new territory. Para 
military leaders carried out a public relations campaign employing a range of
strategies to engender public acceptance of their role as political spokesmen
from the government and international funders. Paramilitary groups with sig
nificant links to a growing number of congressional and local politicians were
central in transforming the electoral map of Colombia.1 These efforts were a
critical component in the domestic and international support for current nego
tiations between the government and paramilitary leaders.
Through these negotiations, the Colombian government demobilized al
most 32,000 paramilitary fighters by July 2007, using traditional conflict
resolution strategies based on the collective disarming, demobilization, a nd
reintegration of combatants. These conflict-resolution techniques have been
developed over the past several decades to bring violent oppositional groups
into legal political life. However, the history and nature of the Colombian
paramilitary forces, particularly their ongoing links with state security forces,
involvement with violent criminal enterprises, and strategic deployment of
public relations and media campaigns to increase public support of their
claims without substantially altering their abusive practices, pose profound
challenges to the employment of traditional peacebuilding strategies in Co
lombia. Unlike the insurgents who have participated in previous peace nego
tiations with the Colombian government, the paramilitaries were not radical
leftists intent on defeating the government, but rather were led by elite ranch
ers and farmers-many deeply implicated in drug trafficking-who cla imed
to support the state. While guerrilla factions. have long employed public di
plomacy to further their cause, the paramili �ries have brought an unprece
dented level of sophistication to their public relations campaigns. This chap
ter will examine how paramilitaries used new forms of technology, such as
the Internet, and organizational forms including non-governmental organi
zations (NGOs) and foundations to increase public support and justify their
negotiations with the government. These paramilitary forces offer an exam
ple of how i l legal armed groups can learn political lessons from previous
peace processes. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of negotiations
within the Colombian conflict, outlines the history and evolution of para
military forces there, and then reviews the paramilitaries' efforts to bolster
their legitimacy and articulate their version of the Colombian conflict, be
fore concluding with the challenges that paramilitary groups present to the
conflict-resolution models used in the current negotiations.

Negotiations within the Colombian Conflict
Measuring the degree to which illegal armed groups articulate a valid griev
ance against the state and represent a significant constituency is of critical
1 See Mauricio Romero, ed., Parnpolftica: Ln rutn de In expnnsi6n pnramilitnr y los ncuerdos politicos
( Bogota: Corporaci6n Nuevo A reo Iris and Intermedio Editores, 2007 ).
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importance in assessing prospects for successful negotiations with those
groups. In their analysis of illegal armed groups in entrenched conflicts,
World Bank economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler offered the "greed
a nd grievance" spectrum, concluding that illegal armed groups generally
move from grievance, or the articulation of complaints against the state, to
greed-efforts to capture and maintain control over strategic resources. Their
work was widely used in Colombia's case to explain the evolution of the guer
rillas, who were seen as moving from ideologically based resistance against
the state, to increasing involvement in criminal activity and drug-trade profi
teering. However, Collier and Hoeffler's work has not been sufficiently ana
lyzed in light of groups that have used the articulation of grievances against
the state to further-or to mask-their violent criminal enterprises. In Co
lombia, grievance discourses employed against the state by violent groups
have complex genealogies that do not easily translate along left-right ideo
logical divides. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to trace their
evolution here, these discourses offer deep-rooted political resources for Co
lombian groups to project and claim political legitimacy and public support
even while maintaining extremely violent practices. Liberal guerrillas as well
as organized bandits during and following the partisan violence of the 1950s,
the leadership of the major drug cartels during the 1980s, and some para
military spokesmen in the 1990s have all employed grievance discourses de
crying state inefficiency and illegitimacy to build public support for them
selves . This chapter focuses on the paramilitary leadership's use of grievance
discourses and an accompanying repertoire of political practices to garner
greater public support and access to official political resources (including the
opportunity to run for elected office and receive state funding). By portraying
themselves as motivated primarily by grievance-as victims of guerrilla vio
lence forced to take up arms when abandoned by the state-paramilitaries
attempt to counter the perception that they are motivated primarily by greed,
whether defending the interests of large landowners and drug traffickers or
conducting death squad operations as clandestine agents of state counterin
surgency efforts.
With a few notable exceptions, the majority of analyses of Colombian para
militaries have focused on human rights concerns or have been journalistic
accounts of their m ilitary operations. The most detailed work examining the
evolution of Colombian paramilitary forces has employed the concept of mil
itary entrepreneurs to describe the shifting movement between legally sanc
tioned activities and illegality over time and has underscored how paramili
tary forces have defended di fferent economic interests in different regions.2
This framework, while useful in describing those shifts, does not allow an
2See Thomas Gallant, " Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism and State Formation: Transnational
Crime from a Historical World System Perspective," in States and lllegal Practices, ed. joseph
Heyman (Oxford: Berg, 1999); Mauricio Romero, Parnmilitares y autodefensas, 1982-2003 (Bo
gota: LEP Rl, 2003).
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exploration of how paramilitary leaders have strategically used political rep
ertoires, discourses, and organizational forms-many traditionally employed
by the left-to increase their public support. The acceptance of the paramili
taries as a negotiating partner with the government is the most significant
sign of their success in reframing and legitimating their cause.
The talks begun in 2003 between paramilitary groups and the Colombian
government were only the latest such negotiations in the long history of
peace efforts in Colombia. Although ultimately unsuccessful in resolving the
armed conflict, such efforts have allowed the demobilization of thousands of
combatants from individual guerrilla groups. Amnesties and reintegration
programs for bandits and Liberal Party guerrillas in the 1950s were the first
such efforts. Talks with Marxist guerrillas began in the early 1980s, long be
fore their more successful Central American counterparts would engage in
dialogues for peace. By the 1990s, an international diplomatic consensus
widely accepted negotiations with illegal armed groups-even for those per
ceived by some in the U.S. government to have employed illegal tactics or to
represent unsavory ideological projects-as an established model for resolu
tion of violent conflict. Colombia's recent paramilitary demobilization efforts
are unprecedented in their size and scope; the government has moved al
most 32,000 paramilitary members through its programs, while previous col
lective guerrilla demobilizations have involved at most only a few thousand
fighters.
Previous negotiations offer many lessons to thoughtful combatants. In
many cases of collective demobilization, former .combatants suffered serious
persecution, both from former enemies and from still active former comrades.
•

In part because of this violence, no guerrilla force has been successful in creating a sustainable legal political party. Combatants concerned about the pos
sible legal repercussions of demobilization may note that none of the thou
sands of combatants participating in these processes have faced trials or truth
commissions attempting to address criminal violence or abuse that they may
have committed. Indeed, many enjoyed significant economic benefits through
government subsidies and reintegration programs. Finally, former guerrillas
were able to return to "legal life," rejoining their home communities, and
many movement leaders were able to run for political office, head founda
tions and NGOs, and become political commentators with respect from many
quarters. Merely participating in such talks can generate public support for
groups involved, even if the negotiations are ultimately unsuccessful.
Paramilitary groups participating in negotiations with the government
have already obtained concrete benefits. Like demobilized guerrillas before
them, demobilized paramilitary members receive a government stipend (in
this case, slightly less than minimum wage for two years) in addition to em
ployment and educational benefits. While delivery of promised benefits and
services has suffered significant delays, such incentives remain an important
factor, particularly for rank-and-file paramilitary members. More important
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for paramilitary leaders facing criminal indictments, implementation of the
Justice and Peace Law passed in 2005 and discussed further by Arturo J. Car
rillo in Chapter 7 of this volume has produced little accountability. While the
law was significantly strengthened by a May 2006 decision of the Constitu
tional Court, which required a complete confession and full declaration of
assets and expanded the definition of victims eligible for reparations, execu
tion of the law has been slow.3 Implementation depends on the 23 prosecutors
and 150 investigators assigned to the Justice and Peace Unit of the Attorney
General's Office, which must handle the 2,812 demobilized paramilitaries ac
cused of crimes against humanity. As of June 2007, only forty of the accused
had given their first testimony, and the investigation process was signifi
cantly delayed, with many of the accused refusing to provide information.
Charges in some cases have been dismissed because witnesses recanted pre
vious testimony; at least four prominent leaders of victims' groups call ing for
investigations have been assassinated.4

Evolution of Paramilitary Forces
"Paramilitary groups" and "self-defense groups" describe a range of differ
ent armed actors in Colombia over the past fifty years. These groups have
developed according to profoundly different regional dynamics.5 Despite re
gional variation, the evolution of paramilitary groups can be divided roughly
into three major, at times overlapping, phases: death squad operations, in the
1970s and early 1980s; private armies funded by the drug trade, in the late
1980s and early 1990s; and the efforts to consolidate paramilitary groups un
der a single coordinating body represented by national spokesmen partici
pating in public political li fe, starting in the late 1990s.

Paramilitary Death Squad Operations
One of the major differences between paramilitary groups and those ille
gal armed actors that have engaged in peace talks and demobilization pro
grams is that paramilitaries historically have acted in concert with-and been
3See International Crisis Group ( ICG), Colombia: Towards Peace and justice, Latin America
Report no. 16 (Bogota/ Brussels: TCG, March 14, 2006), www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.
cfm?id=4020&1=1 (accessed September 30, 2008); also Human Rights Watch, Letting Parmnili
taries off the Hook (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004), www.h rw.org/backgrounder/
americas/colomb ia0105/ (accessed September 30, 2008); Latin America Working Group
(LAWG), Colombia: Tile Other Half of the Truth ( Washington, D.C.: LAWG, June 2008), http://
lawg.org/docs/the_other_hal f_of_the_truth.pdf (accessed September 30, 2008) .
Adam lsacson, "The 'justice and Peace' process takes a grotesque turn," June 24, 2007, Center
for International Policy, www.cipcol.org/?p=431#more-431 (accessed August 23, 2008).

4

5For greater detail on the history of paramilitaries, see Romero, Paramilitares y autodefensas;
Francisco Cubicles, "Los paramilitares y su estrategia," in Reconocer Ia guerra para construir In
pnz, eds. Malcolm Deas and Marfa Victoria Llorente (Bogota: Grupo Editorial Norma, 1999);
Carlos Medina, Autodefensas, pammilitares y narcotrnfico en Colombia: Origen, desarrollo y consoli
daci6t7: el caso "Puerto Boyacn" (Bogota: Editorial Documentos Periodisticos, 1990).
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supported by-the state military apparatus rather than in opposition to the
state. (An i mportant exception to this is the paramilitary violent repression of
state judicial efforts to investigate paramilitary crimes, particularly involving
the drug trade.) Paramilitary groups have periodically been legally incorpo
rated into counterinsurgency efforts, and the links between legal and illegal
parami litaries have historica lly been pervasive. The legal basis for state spon
sorship of paramilitary organizations was Law 48, approved by the Colom
bian Congress in 1968, which allowed the government to "mobilize the popu
lation in activities and tasks" to restore public order.6 International pressure
and additional attacks against government officials led President Virgilio
Barco to declare the creation of paramilitary groups illegal in 1989. The ex
pansion of paramilitary groups in the 1990s coincided with the organization
of legal rural defense forces, known as the "Convivir." Officially launched in
1995, the Convivir were enthusiastically supported by Alvaro Uribe during
his tenure as governor of Antioquia (1995-98). Following numerous com
plaints of Convivir participation in human rights abuses, the Supreme Court
upheld their legality in 1997 but prohibited them from collecting intelligence
for the security forces and from receiving military-issued weapons?
According to human rights groups and government investigators, during
the first phase of paramilitary activity, there was considerable overlap be
tween the civilians legally trained by local military forces in the 1970s and
illegal paramilitary death squads, such as the American Anti-Communist
Alliance, active in the Magdalena region.8

Expansion of Private Armies
The first qualitative shift in Colombian paramilitary groups came in the
1980s, when money from the drug trade a llowed such forces to grow from
small groups linked to local military commanders to private armies. Unlike
the death squad operations in other Latin American countries, the paramili
taries benefited from the enormous resources provided by Colombia's most
lucrative industry: drug trafficking. The fusion of counterinsurgency ideol
ogy and illegal narcotics revenue produced one of the most lethal fighting
forces in Latin America. As the owners of vast haciendas (the result of money
laundering and efforts to buy their way into the landed gentry, known as
6See M ichael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Cou11terinsurgency,
1940-1990 (New York: Pantheon, 1 992), 222-23.

and Counterterrorism,

7 Washington Office on Latin America, Losing Ground: Colombian H111r1n11 Rights Defenders under
Attack (Washington, D.C.: WOLA, 1997); Human Rights Watch, Colombia's Killer Networks (New
York: Human R ights Watch, 1995); Human Rights Watch, Yearly Report 1997 (New York: Hu
man R ights Watch, 1997); Office of the United Nations H igh Commissioner for Human R ights,
Report 2000 (New York: Un ited Nations, 2000), 24.
8See Michael Evans, ed., "The Truth About the Triple A," an electronic briefing book published
by the National Security A rchive, 2007, www.gwu.edu/-nsarch iv/NSAE BB/NSA E BB223/
index.htrn (accessed September 10, 2008).
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"reverse agrarian reform"), drug traffickers needed protection from the guer
rillas, whose primary fund-raising techniques involved boleteo (extortion),

vacunas ("vaccination" against guerrilla attack), and, increasingly, kidnap
ping of rural elites. Paramilitary groups linked to drug cartels (particularly
the Medellin Cartel) worked closely with Colombian military officers to
eliminate suspected guerrilla sympathizers, while at the same time attacking
Colombian authorities who tried to investigate drug trafficking. Paramilitary
groups were particularly vicious in targeting activists from the leftist parties,
who enjoyed considerable support following the 1987 reforms, which allowed
popular election of mayors and other local officials previously appointed to
their posts.9
Paramilitary groups organized in the Middle Magdalena Valley-one of
the epicenters of the drug-financed landgrab of the 1980s-became pioneers
in the politicization of paramilitary activities, attempting to unify their grow
ing military power into a grassroots base that would serve as the foundation
for political control. In 1983, Puerto Boyaca mayor Luis Rubio, together with
allies in the Liberal Party, created the Association of Middle Magdalena
Ranchers and Farmers (ACDEGAM). As part of their political strategy to
strengthen ties among local farmers, businessmen, the "self-defense forces,"
and the military, members set up more than thirty schools of�ering "patriotic
and anti-Communist" education, health clinics, and agricultural coopera
tives and built roads and bridges, all funded by a combination of "voluntary
contributions" and government and private money. According to journalist
and historian Steven Dudley, however, the ACDEGAM also served as "the
autodefensas' center of operations. Recruiting, weapons storage, communica
tions, propaganda, and medical services were all run from ACDEGAM head
quarters."10 ACDEGAM leadership worked with the support of local and na
tional politicians, including Congressman Pablo Guarin. By the end of the
1980s, ACDEGAM, together with a sister organization known as "Tradici6n,
Familia y Propiedad," made up the core of a new political movement called
Movimiento de Restoraci6n Nacional (MORENA). Spurred by the electoral
reforms, MORENA candidates won six mayoral seats in the Middle Magdalena
Valley, self-proclaimed the "National Front of Anti-Subversive Mayors." Out
side its regional strongholds in the Middle Magdalena Valley, MORENA
never achieved national prominence or even significant support in other
regions with significant paramilitary presence. The paramilitary political
movement would not emerge until the late 1990s, although the surviving
9For the history of the Pat riotic Union, see Steven Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla
Politics in Colombia (New York: Routledge, 2004); Romero, Parnmilitares y autodefensas.
10Dudley, Walking Ghosts, 68. See also F rancisco Gutierrez Sanfn and Mauricio Baron, " Re
Stating the State: Paramilitary Territorial Cont rol and Political Order in Colombia" (rE P R I
working paper no. 66, Crisis States P rogramme Working Papers series no. 1, Development
Research Centre, London School of Economics, September 2005).
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leadership went on to play a major role in the new paramilitary structure. For
example, Ivan Roberto Duque ("Ernesto Baez"), former secretary-general of
ACDEGAM and founder of MORENA, went on to be an architect of the para
militaries' evolving political platform.
Current paramilitary leaders may also be drawing on the efforts of Colom
bian drug traffickers, particularly the Medellin Cartel, to bolster public sup
port. Cartel boss Pablo Escobar used several tactics to increase his public
profile and influence, including running for elected office (he was elected
congressional representative alternate in 1982) and funding community de
velopment. In their unsuccessful efforts to prevent approval of extradition,
the "Extraditables" (a group of drug traffickers led by Escobar) used human
rights discourses and nationa lism in communiques and media interviews to
frame their cause as not simply organized crime but a legitimate political and
essentially Colombian enterprise. (They also resorted to extreme violence,
called "narcoterrorism.") Many drug traffickers also engaged i n negotiations
with the central government as well as with local officials.11 During this pe
riod, several influential leaders of the paramilitaries, including the Castano
brothers, were deeply involved in drug trafficking and active in efforts to
build the political legitimacy of trafficking organizations.

Emer gence of the AUC
The third phase of expansion was marked by the creation of a national coor
dinating body of paramilitary groups, the AUC.12 Following a summit in July
1997, the AUC issued a statement announcing an offensive military campaign
into new regions of the country "according to the operational capacity of each
regional group." Newly created "mobile squads"-elite training and combat
units-carried out these operations, which included numerous massacres
targeting the civilian population in these areas. The July 1997 massacre in
Mapiripan, Meta, was the first step in implementing this new plan. During
July 15-20, 1997, gunmen from the AUC took control of Mapiripan, killed
at least forty people, and threatened others. The exact death toll was never
established, because many of the bodies were dismembered and thrown into
a nearby river. Following a lengthy investigation, a military court sentenced
"See Mary J. Roldan, "Cocaine and the 'Miracle' of Modernity in Medellin," in Cocni11e: Global
Histories, ed. Paul Gootenberg (New York: Routledge, 1999); Francisco Thoumi, Illegal Drugs,
Economy and Society in the A11des ( Baltimore, Md.: Woodrow Wilson Center/Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2003) .
12For more detail on drug trafficking and paramilitary groups in Colombia, see Alonso Sala
zar, La Parabola de Pablo: Auge y cafda de un gran capo del narcotrnfico (Bogota: Editorial Planeta,
2001); Robin Kirk, More Terrible than Death: Massacres, Drugs and America's War in Colombia
(New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 108-09; Alvaro Camacho, "Narcotrafico y violencias en
Colombia" (conference transcript from the Historical Analysis of Narcotra fficking in Colom
bia symposium, National Museum, Bogota, October 30, 2003).
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Gen. Jaime Uscategui to forty months in jail for dereliction of duty because he
failed to respond to repeated requests for action by local authorities and his
own subordinates.13 AUC fighters carried out similar massacres through
out the country. At the same time, paramilitary leaders gained increasing
power within local and national politics. This has been dramatically dem
onstrated in the parapolftica scandal that first emerged in the fall of 2006 and
caused the resignation of the foreign minister and the head of the national
intelligence service.14 As of August 2008, the investigation remains ongo
ing; twenty-nine members of Congress have been detained and an addi
tional thirty-nine remain under investigation.15

Paramilitary Public Relations
Since its formal incorporation, the AUC has been engaged in a major public
relations campaign to improve its image and represent itself as a legitimate
political force. Its first communiques copied the style of the guerrillas, issued
with a dateline "from the mountains of Colombia" (previously, the guerrillas
were the only armed actors inhabiting el monte), with a color logo in the let
terhead depicting a peasant man silhouetted against a map of Colombia. In
marked contrast to other forms of communication from paramilitary groups,
such as the death threats intended to strike fear in the recipients (often sent
in creative forms such as funeral invitations), these communiques showcased
the political nature of the organization.
In addition to written communiques, the paramilitaries created a series of
sophisticated Web pages that reflected their preoccupation with public rela
tions. In 1999, the paramilitaries launched "Colombialibre.org," a Web site
that, by 2001, rivaled official Colombian government sites in its sophistication,
graphics, and content. (The guerrillas' Web sites, by contrast, languished until
2003 with only occasional flashing updates.) One of the first documents
posted on the site included "proposals for structural reforms for the construc
tion of a new Colombia," a longside diagrams outlining the AUC's structure
of command, communiques, open letters issued by paramilitary leaders, and
docu ments outlining the history and evolution of paramilitary forces. By
2005, the still active Web site was home to daily press links to articles featur
ing paramilitary commanders and activities, as well as links to the home

130ne o f the military officers who requested assistance, Col. Lino Sanchez, was also investi
gated fo r misconduct as a result of his public testimony in the case.
14See john Otis, "Court Tell-Ails T ie the Elite to Paramilitary Killings," Houston Chronicle, May
20, 2007.
"These figures are from a table produced by the Colombian think tank lnstituto de Estudios
para el Desarrollo y para Ia Paz ( IN D E PAZ), www.indepaz.org.co/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=646&Itemid=l (accessed September 8, 2008).
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pages of the regional blocs making up the AUC, which featured their own

communiques and command-structure diagrams.16

In addition to use of the Internet, the AUC leadership, under the command
of Carlos Castano, also launched a media outreach offensive. Colombian
journa list Maria Cristina Caballero claims to have carried out one of the first
major press interviews with Castano in 1997, following the Mapiripan mas
sacre described above. During the interview, Castano announced that he was
"tired of fighting and ready to sit down at the negotiating table." At the time,
President Andres Pastrana had made peace talks with the FARC the major
focus of his administration. In her account, Cabal lero reports asking Casta no
to "prepare a document explaining what he wanted to achieve with his move
ment and proposing the key reforms the country needed for peace." His re
ply was later published by the Colombian newsmagazine Cambia 16 in May
1998, along with responses from the guerrilla leadership.17 Widespread and
apparently systematic interviews with the press did not begin until 2000,
however. In March of that year, Castano appeared in his first on-camera in
terview in a prime-time special on Caracol network. In an apparent effort to
soften his warrior image, he appeared wearing a sweater and slacks. He ad
mitted that he often cried when thinking of the tragedies caused by the fight
ing in Colombia and that his troops should have "operated with more pru
dence." In addition to subsequent nearly weekly appearances in the Colombian
press, Castano was featured on the cover of the international edition of Time
magazine on November 27, 2000, and profiled in the Washington Post (under
the headline "King of the Jungle") on March 12, 2001. That same year, Castano
approved the release of My Confession, a fawning biography resulting from a
series of interviews with a Colombian journalist. The book became a Colom
bian best seller. Regional paramilitary leaders also began appearing fre
quently in the Colombian press during this period. After Castano's d isap
pearance on April 16, 2004, Northern Bloc commander Salvatore Mancuso
was often featured in the press, and his biography, Salvatore Mancuso: Life
Enough for One Hundred Years, was published in late 2004; in May 2005, he
launched his own Web site, highlighting his analysis and speeches. Castano's
brother Vicente Castano Gil was featured for his first press interview on the
cover of Colombian newsmagazine Semana in June 2005. In the interview, he
clearly attempted to position himself as a long-standing power behind Car16
As of june 2007, a much-reduced version of the "Colombialibre.org" Web site was dedicated
to the " National Movement of Demobilized Self-Defense Forces," with empty pages and no
links to regional groups. By the following month, the site was completely dismantled. As
of this writing, Mancuso has been extradited to the United States to face drug-trafficking
charges and it is unclear how this will impact the ongoing Colombian investigations into his
human rights crimes as required by the justice and Peace Law.

17Maria Cristina Caballero, "A Journalist's Mission in Colombia: Reporting Atrocities Ts
Not Enough," Columbia journalism Review (May-June 2000), http://backissues.cjrarchives.org/
year/00/2/caballero.asp (accessed September 9, 2008).
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los's public face and stressed the political evolution and focus of the para
mili taries under his command.
Complementing their media and Internet presence, paramilitary leaders
also attempted to transform perceptions of their organizational structure
and behavior through the publication of command diagrams and internal
reg ulations, and their emphasis on the acceptance of human rights and inter

national humanitarian law standards (in ma rked contrast to the guerrilla
leadership, which publicly rejected such norms as illegitimate and part of a

neoliberal and repressive regime that does not apply to them). According to
the Constitutional Statutes and Disciplinary Regime adopted in May 1998
at the AUC's second national conference, the organization had developed
into a highly regimented military command structure incorporating regional
groups; part of the military discipline included instructing new recruits to
obey international humanitarian law, a lso known as the "rules of war," and
to refrain from violating human rights.
This approach was partly the result of active consultation with a number
of well-educated advisers. In his biography, Carlos Castano claims to have
worked extensively with Jesuit-trained intellectuals to develop the AUC's po
litical strategy. International organizations, foremost among them the Inter
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), also played a role. In 1997, the
ICRC negotiated a new memorandum of agreement with the Colombian gov
ernment that allowed ICRC representatives to have direct contacts with ille
gal armed groups. As a result of that agreement, the head of the ICRC, Pierre
Gassmann, was one of the first international officials to meet with Castano.
One staff member at the time recalled, "It was a controversial decision, but
the ICRC v iewed them as an armed actor with a clear line of command, which
is enough under international humanitarian law." The ICRC also offered
training in international humanitarian law to combatants. The same staff
member, who worked in southern Colombia during the late 1990s, gave
"three or four" workshops to the paramilitaries. "They were easy to get in
touch with; you had the cell phones of all the local commanders and their
commanders, and they always responded quickly to requests," he told me.
"Their troops were mainly young men from cities like Medellin and Cali, just
guys who wanted a job," he concluded. "But they had a very clear line of
command to Castano; they knew that the ICRC boss had talked to Castano,
and were afraid of getting him mad." The impact of these classes on para
military behavior in the field was unclear. Murder and massacre rates in
some regions seemed to decline, but figures are notoriously unreliable since
many deaths, particularly in rural areas, are never reported.
The ICRC representatives were not the only officials to contact Castano.
Journalists, international groups attempting to promote humanitarian agree
ments, representatives of Colombian Protestant and Catholic churches, gov
ernment officials, and NGOs acknowledged holding frequent off-the-record
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meetings with paramilitary commanders during the late 1990s. On at least
two occasions, high-ranking government ministers have met with Castano;
Minister of the Interior Horacio Serpa met with Castano to discuss threats
against Serpa's own life, and a high-ranking delegation met with Castano to
negotiate the liberation of seven members of Congress kidnapped by the
AUC in May 1999. Local government officials also met frequently with para
military commanders in their regions.
Paramilitary groups are creating foundations and NGOs to promote their
agenda. Extremely lenient Colombian legislation governing the administra
tion of such organizations has facilitated their use by groups from across the
political spectrum. One of the first such organizations was the Fundacion
para la Paz (Funpazcor), established in Cordoba in the early 1990s by Carlos
Castano's older brother, Fidel, and run by his sister-in-law. Set up to distribute
land to demobilized Popular Liberation Army (EPL) fighters, many of whom
later joined Fidel's restructured paramilitary force, then known as the Auto
defensas Campesinas de Cordoba y Uruba (ACC U, a forerunner of the AUC),
the foundation has been controversial. It remains unclear to what degree the
entity functioned as a foundation, and how much land it distributed. The
foundation has been under investigation by the Attorney General's Office for
serving as a front for illegal weapons purchases and other criminal dealings,
and it is currently on the U.S. State Department list of terrorist front organiza
tions. Since the early 1990s, scores of paramilitary-sponsored NGOs have
been organized. According to paramilitary commander Jorge 40, most women
involved in the paramilitaries are "dedicated to social and political projects."18
Isabel Bolanos is one such example. Origiqally linked to peasant organiza
tions and guerrilla groups including the EPL, she worked closely with Carlos
Castano in development projects throughout the late 1990s before her capture
in 1999, when she was charged with various paramilitary crimes.19 In some
cases, these efforts are building on more than a decade of privately organized,
paterna listic land redistribution efforts, such as the proposal by the cattle
ranchers' association Federacion Colombiana de Ganaderos (FEDEGAN) that
members donate land to peasant settlers in conflictual areas.
"They [the AUC] a re preparing political proposals, including buying
land and offering work, to win over people. It is very serious political work,"
an evangelical pastor who had been working i n northern Cordoba for many
years told me in 2001. These political and financial efforts have made it
more d ifficult for grassroots and church organizations to maintain their
community-based projects. "We can't respond in the same way as the paras
18 Author interview, January 15, 2005.
19 Bolanos' life history was included in a collection of tesbmonies by Patricia Lara, Las Mujeres
en/a guerra ( Bogota: Editorial Planeta, 2000). It is also likely that she was the woman identified
as "Rosa" in Alma Guillermoprieto's article titled "Our New War in Colombia," New York Re
view of Books 47, no. 6 (Apri I 13, 2000).
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can, in terms of offering resources. It i s a church of peasants-the going rate
for a day's work is four thousand pesos [less than US$2], and they are offer
ing eight thousand. They are organizing the communities, buying land; they
are doubling their troops."
In another example of adopting leftist tactics, paramilitary-backed organi
zations in Bolivar organized a series of self-proclaimed "peace" marches and
road blockades to protest a proposed "demilitarized" zone for peace talks
with the ELN in 2000 and 2001. The two main organizations, Asocipaz and
No al Despeje, were widely credited with shutting down the talks. AUC com
mander Carlos Castano publicly supported their efforts on his Web site,
where he credited the AUC with militarily defeating the ELN in the region.
The AUC was also widely believed to have provided financial and logistical
support to these groups.20
Since their demobilization as part of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc in Novem
ber 2003, demobilized paramilitaries in Medellin are becoming actively in
volved in a number of local community projects. Their flagship organization,
the Democracy Foundation, promotes community development and small
business projects for demobilized paramilitaries. Among their projects, they
are organizing "neighborhood invasions," efforts by the poor and internally
displaced to establish squatter settlements. Demobilized leaders have been
elected to local offices. While such efforts have been common in previous
cases of guerrilla demobilizations, what is significant in this case is the de
gree to which demobilized paramilitaries remain engaged with active para
military forces in the region. 'The problem is not that they are doing political
things-that is what happened during all the demobilization processes, with
the EPL, M-19, ELN," one Medellin-based community activist told me. "The
problem is their capacity for intimidation, armed and unarmed. Leaders have
to submit, leave, or be killed." Reports by the International Crisis Group, Am
nesty International, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
have all concluded that paramilitary groups maintain control over Medellin
neighborhoods-and, in many cases, are working in concert with demobi
lized individuals.
Paramilitary leaders freely admit that efforts to increase social control in
the areas where they maintain a permanent presence are part of their new
strategy to expand their authority. Community and religious leaders from a
number of areas where paramilitary groups have consolidated military con
trol, including parts of southern Colombia, the Magdalena Media region, and
the northern coast, have reported over the past five years that paramilitary
commanders have begun to regulate virtually every facet of social life-they
are mediating domestic disputes, establishing codes of conduct and dress,

20See Omar Gutierrez, "La oposici6n regional a las negociaciones con el ELN," A111ilisis Politico
17, no. 51 (2004).
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and meting out harsh punishments for community members who do not
comply with these codes. According to Comandante Andres, a senior mem
ber of the Norte Bloc, "We became the police in the region. If a woman says,
'My husband hit me,' we have to solve their problems. We solve money dis
putes and the issue of i nheritances." Despite the decline in homicides in re
gions of consolidated paramilitary control, violence and intimidation are still
employed to enforce compliance. Religious leaders in southern Colombia re
ported that young men who failed to obey the rules of conduct in their com
munities were punished, first by having their heads shaved, then by beat
ings, amputation of fingers, and even death. During an interview in January
2005, one such leader recounted how paramilitaries had consolidated their
presence in the areas where he did pastoral outreach. He noted:
They recruited a lot of young men from the zone, to build up the
command structure in the area. Their plan is to get involved in
the community dynamic, to penetrate it, gain absolute control. In the
town, now everything is controlled by them, even the traditional
things like rituals of baptism. If someone wants to kill someone from
the town, it has to be approved [by the paramilitary leader]. They
provide logistical support for the political part of the work and the
social services network. Today the political component is very strong.
The personero [municipal human rights official] himself is one of
them.21

Paramilitary commanders also freely admit that they are closely involved
with official structures of local governance in the areas they control. "We
advise the authorities so they take advantage of the best opportunities for
their communities," Comandante Andres told me. Both Jorge 40 and Salva

tore Mancuso made similar pronounce ments during interviews.
According to Amnesty International,

A significant component of their strategy for exercising control over
the population is the imposition of rules of conduct in even the most
private of spheres: intervention in disputes between family members
or neighbours and the use of corporal punishment to punish trans
gressors. These activities have been carried out with the knowledge,
acquiescence and participation of the security forces. This type of
control is often preceded or accompanied by what the paramilitary
groups call "social cleansing"-the killing of petty criminals, prosti
tutes, and others perceived as "socially undesirable"-designed to
show how efficient they are at establishing "public order." Amnesty
International has received testimonies that point to the persecution,
disappearance, and killing of persons from stigmatized groups, in
cluding sex workers, people targeted because of their sexual orienta
tion, and alleged carriers of STDs such as HIVIAIDS.22

21 Member of the clergy, interview by the author, southern Colombia, January 2005.

Amnesty International, Colombia: "Scarred Bodies, Hidden Crimes:" Violence against Women in
the Am1ed Conflict, AI Index: AMR 23/048/2004 (London: Amnesty International, October 13,

22

2004), www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR 23/040/2004 (accessed September 8, 2008).
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The Bogota office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights and the International Crisis Group have also reported alleged links
between paramilitary groups and local government agencies, including the
Administrators of the Subsidized Health Regime (ARS) and a Barranquilla
based, government-contracted tax-collection service, as well as between para
military groups, political leaders, the Administrative Department for Secu
rity (DAS, a specialized branch of the police), and the Attorney General's
Office in the department of Norte de Santander.23

The Paramilitary Narrative: Victims and Victors
Through interviews, Web sites, and other documents, paramilitary leaders
have articulated a new version of Colombian history in which they are both
the victims in the Colombian conflict, sacrificing security and domestic life to
defend the nation, and the victors, able to defeat the guerrillas i n areas where
the military merely maintained an uneasy stalemate or ceded control en
tirely. In this narrative, paramilitary forces emerged as an independent force
ready to step into the vacuum left by an absent state. For many Colombians,
including many in the rural elite and the urban middle class, this narrative
resonates with their direct experience (as well as projected fears) of guerrilla
violence and the failure of the state to provide security. The role of drug traf
ficking in financing paramilitary operations and of other financial interests
in determining the priorities of paramilitary leaders is completely erased.
I heard one version of this history from paramilitary commander Salva
tore Mancuso the day before his public demobilization on January 18, 2005.
Following Castano's disappearance in April 2004, Mancuso assumed the
public role of political ideologue and major promoter of paramilitary negotia
tions with the government. Mancuso is well known among the Colombia
elite. The son of an Italian immigrant, he was raised within the cloistered
world of the cattle barons of the Atlantic coast and studied in the United
States. He claims to have traveled later to Vietnam to learn about counterin
surgency techniques and to have become an accomplished helicopter pilot.
We met at the end of a long day as the members of the North Bloc, whom
Mancuso had summoned for demobilization, were going through the prein
terview and documentation phase before the formal ceremony scheduled to
take place a few days later. Forty-two years old, plump, and sunburned, he
was wearing the uniform of a wealthy Colombian on his day off: khaki pants
with a polo shirt and deck shoes. Appearing tired and often sighing, he told
230ffice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, "Report of the High Com
m issioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia," E/CN.4/2005/10,
February 28, 2005, 19, www.hchr.org.co/docu mentoseinformes/documentos/in forme2004/
documentos.php3?cat=60 (accessed September 30, 2008); TCG, Colombia's New Armed Groups,
Latin America Report no. 20 (Bogota/ Brussels: ICG, May 10, 2007 ), www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?id=4824&1=1 (accessed September 30, 2008).
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me, with the studied calm of someone who had related the story many times
before, the story of how he joined the paramilitaries.
He began with how the government had abandoned them in the face of
escalating guerrilla violence. "In the beginning, it was simple. We were cattle
ranchers, gente de bien. But at a certain moment in life, things change." During
the late 1980s, the EPL and, later, the FARC grew bolder a mong the vast haci
endas that filled the northern coast of Colombia, promoting peasant organi
zations and kidnapping and extorting local landowners. Mancuso was one
of many among the economic elites who sought support from the military
to protect their holdings. "I worked very closely with the state," he said. "I set
up a communications network for the army and the police. We set it up to get
information to the army. It went well in the beginning. But the commanders
changed, and they didn't want to respond to the needs in the community.
They said they wouldn't go into the red zone [that is, areas of known guer
rilla strength]; they were afraid that they would get the soldiers or them
selves killed. They have no commitment to the country; they are just looking
out for their own careers."
By the mid-1990s, some ranchers and business leaders were ready to take
matters into their own hands, and they met in 1997 to plan their strategy.
"The government denied us help," Mancuso explained, "so we had two op
tions: run away or confront them. We decided to confront the problem. We
sent public letters asking for help, to the national government, to the minister
of defense at that time, Fernando Botero. There is a copy on the Web site. We
sent copies to the armed forces, the president, the human rights ombudsman

[defensor]. But they never answered me."

1

This new organization involved personal transformation from commu
nity member to leader and institutional transformation involving the cre
ation of a parallel state structure. "Things have changed drastically," said
Mancuso. "Before, I was a rancher; now I represent two hundred and fifty
ranchers-I fight for them and for me. When the guerrilla came, I had to start
looking out for my neighbors. It was a snowbal l effect. I started defending my
own interests, then my neighbors' interests, now everyone's interests." Al
though the initial response was to provide security for landowners in the
area, the paramilitary forces assumed a much larger role within the commu
nity, ultimately taking over the essential roles of the state-prov iding secu
rity and mediating conflicts, but also building infrastructure, establishing
schools, and offering health care. "So we had to fix the roads, pay for the
schools, pay for education," Manc uso explained. "We became the state.
Slowly we became a substitute for the state, which had never been present.
We had to pay for water [acueductos]; we had to pay the salary for the teachers,
the doctors, the nurses. Here there were no roads. How much did we have to
pay to put in the roads?"
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Paramilitaries also fundamentally changed the social composition of the
region by repopulating areas from which landowners and peasants had been
forcibly displaced by violence. "We brought in friends to buy the land. After
the displacements, the people who the guerrillas forced out-some people
began coming back to their land, or we found other people to buy it." The
paramilitaries a lso got involved in political organizing, creating the local as
sociations that form the backbone of Colombian political life, including neigh
borhood associations (juntas de acci6n comunal), and successfully running
candidates for local elections, including town councils, state assemblies, and
mayoralties.
According to Mancuso, the paramilitaries did more than replace the state.
They were better than the state, because of their resources and because they
were unencumbered by the institutional procedures and limitations of de
mocracy. "Social control is a simple issue when you have to resolve all the
problems of the state," he said. "You become what you are trying to substi
tute, but we are more efficient, because the state has more bureaucracy, more
limitations. We have the advantage because we don't have to deal with the
bureaucracy; we can just solve problems. When we get involved, things get
done. We have the resources; we put in electricity, schools."
The discourse of efficiency and organizing services, in�luding security,
without the state's help-"getting things done"-has a long history in the
clientelistic relations that have characterized Colombian politics. It was a
hallmark of the mafia-state structures established by the cartels that have
flourished in this area of Colombia for the past two decades.
In addition to employing their own resources, paramilitary forces in the
region increased local community access to state resources by shepherding
development proposals through the appropriate channels. Mancuso said,
"We helped communities prepare projects that were then submitted to the
governmental agencies-and approved. We directly contracted the engineers
for the projects."
According to Mancuso, the paramilitaries' plans for political influence ex
tend beyond the simple demobilization of their troops to include defending
the communal responsibilities they assumed as the proto-state: "After the
demobilization, we are going to create a political party, because we have too
much responsibility for the community, the people in the region, to abandon
the work we started. We will keep working to solve the problems in the com
munity, the economic and the social problems."
This account is notable not just for its positive portrayal of paramilitary
forces as community organizers, but also for what it leaves out. Drug traffick
ing as a source of revenue for paramilitary groups is completely absent from
Mancuso's engaging description of life on the Colombian Caribbean coast,
which has been dramatically transformed by the rise of the illicit narcotics
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trade over the past three decades. The parami litaries appear to act only de
fensively, to protect their property and rights from guerrilla attacks, with no
mention of the offensive military strategy that characterized their incursions
into other areas of the country throughout the 1990s. Finally, there is no men
tion of other political forces in the region, including legal opposition parties,
grassroots organizations, and social movements.
I heard similar stories from other paramilitary commanders whom I inter
viewed; this version of Colombian history also appears in the documents
explaining paramilitary "origin and evolution" available on paramilitary
Web sites and in the fawning biographies profiling paramilitary leaders. In
their accounts, paramilitary leaders borrow heavily from the genre of self
presentation known as testimonial l iterature, which purports to tell the col
lective story of oppressed groups. Most of these narratives have focused on
the experience of victims of human rights violations and, in some cases, of
those who resisted. The reflections of many former guerrilla commanders,
particularly in Centra l America but increasingly in Colombia as well, fit the
genre.24 In a l most all, the narrative arc remains the same: growing up inno
cent of political machinations, called into service by an oppressed commu
nity, frustrated by the impossibility of change through existing channels,
and left with no option but organizing to defend collective interests, result
ing in a personal and communal transformation. In such narratives, once the
domain of leftist resistance efforts against Latin American state oppression,
paramilitary leaders insert their own story of repression by, and resistance to,
guerrilla forces.

Paramilitary Challenges to Conflict- Resolution Models
The shift in paramilitary tactics and the public relations campaign to bolster
the paramilitaries' political legitimacy pose serious chal lenges for ana lysts
and activists interested in pursuing peace in Colombia. First, it is often diffi
cult for analysts to separate the groups' actual practices from their public re
lations efforts. The pursuit of negoti ations with paramilitary groups as well
as with the guerrillas requires clarity on many issues that paramilitary pub
lic relations efforts are designed to conceal. These issues include the degree
to which paramilitary leaders represent a coherent command structure, their
ongoing military operations and responsibility for human rights violations,
24 For more on the testimonial genre, see John Beverley and Marc Zimmerman, Literature and
Politics in the Central American Revolutions (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990). Some of the
best-known testimonies include R igoberta Menchu, 1, Rigoberta Menc/1t1: An Indian Woman in
Guatemala, trans. Ann Wright ( London: Verso, 1983); Alicia Partnoy, Tile Little School: Tales of
Disappearance and Survival in Argentina ( Pittsburgh: Cleis Press, 1 986); and Jacobo Timmerman,
Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number ( New York: Knopf, 1981). Testimonial narratives
from former Colombian guerrillas include Vera Grabe, Razones de vida (Bogota: Planeta, 2000)
and Marfa Eugenia Vasquez Perdomo, Escrito para 110 morir: Bitricora de 1111a militancia ( Bogota:
I LSA-Ediciones Antropos, 2000).
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and their efforts to maintain paramilitary power structures in the context of
negotiations a nd national demobilization efforts.
Public relations efforts disguise the paramilitaries' ongoing brutality. Com
munity and religious leaders in many areas of the country report that the
danger faced by those documenting violence has prevented many crimes
from being registered in official tallies. The evangelical pastor I quoted earlier,
who noted the increased presence of paramilitary political programs, went on
to say that despite his numerous visits lobbying paramilitary leaders to re
spect church leaders, they continued to attack anyone they viewed as a hin
drance to their efforts. "They promise to respect the work, but then, two weeks
ago they killed a pastor while he was delivering a sermon," he said. 'They say
they know that pastors choose sides . . . . They say they do their own intelli
gence, and have people who were in the guerrillas who tell them who the
people are and what they have done."
Paramilitary forces are also resorting to new modalities of violence that
allow perpetrators to escape the scrutiny of international human rights re
porting. These include incidents of "multiple homicides"-killing several
people over a number of days and scattering the bodies, or dumping corpses
in different locations. Such new practices circumvent being documented as
"massacres," which are defined as the killing of four or more individuals in
a single incident and at the same location. Similarly, a new phenomenon
called "confinement" has emerged, according to the reports of some commu
nity leaders.25 As observers count numbers of people forcibly displaced, the
paramilitaries' practice of refusing to allow community members free pas
sage or travel masks the gravity of the issue.
One of the most serious challenges to the demobilization process is to en
sure that the process does not simply channel individuals through demobili
zation programs but dismantles the underlying structu res of paramilitary
power. This does not appear to be happening. Despite the ongoing demobili
zation efforts, paramilitary groups appear to be consolidating and expand
ing their political and military control in many areas of the country. Colom
bian officials rightly praise the reduction of violence in many communities.
In many cases, however, this reduction in violence results not from the ex
pansion of state institutions and the possibilities of genuine participatory de
mocracy but from the social control exercised by paramilitary groups, which,
in many regions, is still based on the threat of violence and the establishment
of parallel authoritarian structures of governance. This danger is equally ap
parent in the areas hosting paramilitary demobilizations. For example, inter
national organizations have reported that demobilized Cacique Nutibara

:L' See U.S. Office on Colombia, "Tools of the Colombian Conflict: Civil ian Con finement and
Displacement," January 2005, www.usofficeoncolombia.org/documents/confinement.pd f (ac
cessed june 18, 2007 ).
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Bloc (CNB ) members continue to use intimidation and maintain connections
with active paramilitary forces in the areas of Medellin where they are at
tempting to consolidate political power. For groups involved in community
development projects in the areas where demobilized CNB members are ac
tive, this presents many significant challenges. Worse, Colombian journalists
and international organizations have documented the emergence of new
armed groups, such as the Black Eagles and the New Generation Organiza
tion, among others. Violence from paramilitary groups that refused to demo
bilize, and the diverse new forms of illegal armed organizations, also pose a
significant challenge.26
Paramilitary public relations efforts also conceal the ongoing role of para
military groups in criminal activities and illegal economies. Many paramili
tary leaders remain deeply involved in drug trafficking, but paramilitary
groups are involved in smuggling and illegal trade of other kinds as well,
particularly the lucrative trade in stolen gasoline. Internal disputes over drug
trafficking have resulted in divisions between "harder-line" paramilitary
leaders more deeply i nvolved in drug trafficking and a more "political line"
of paramilitary leaders supporting demobilization in the name of political
legitimacy. The ongoing conflict and the paramilitaries' uninterrupted pur
suit of lucrative criminal activity complicate the possibility of offering incen
tives for demobilization and increase the risk that combatants will be "recy
cled" back into i l legal armed groups. According to the Colombian National
Police, 474 demobilized para militaries have been killed, although some esti
mates put the number at 1,000. Most were killed because of criminal activity,
but some were reportedly victims of conflict� between newly organized para
military groups.27 There are many additional challenges to efforts to demobi
lize paramilitary forces. These include the lack of centralized control, deep
divisions among the paramilitary leaders, the lack of educational and eco
nomic opportunities for demobilized combatants, and administrative prob
lems within governmental assista nce programs.

Conclusion
Efforts to understand the conditions that made negotiations between Colom
bian paramilitary groups and the government possible must include an anal
ysis of paramilitary campaigns to gain public support. Despite their criminal
activ ities and brutal record, paramilitary leaders have learned to harness the
persuasive power of new technologies, including the Internet, and organiza
tional forms traditionally used by the left, such as creating NGOs, sponsor
ing peace marches, and developing foundations. Their leaders used the me-

26See ICG,

27Ibid., 22.
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dia to articulate a version of Colombian history that depicted paramilitary
forces as both victims and heroes who took responsibility for the security
and social welfare dimensions of the state that had abandoned them. Their
success in these efforts, through co-opting the discourse of peace and social
transformation and concealing the true nature of their agendas and their ac
tions, poses profound challenges to conflict-resolution efforts in Colombia.

